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Cun'e71t Status of Fire Testing Floor-Ceiling Assemblies 
with Duct Systems alld Outlets 
R.G. SANDVIK 
While the floor-ceiling assemblies are normally tested by 
manufacturers of ceiling materials. the Acoustical & Insula­
tion Materials Assn and the Sheet Metal Air Conditioning 
Contractors' National Assn have cooperated on a few tests 
of floor-ceiling assemblies to permit larger ceiJing openings 
to accomodate today's air-conditioning systems. Through 
the testing and listing procedure. many manufacturers of 
ceiling materials have used 12-in. diameter ceiling outlets 
for the air handling system and thereby have. on listed as-
Smokeproof Enclosures 
J.G. DEGENKOlB 
The Life Safety Code. as published by the National Fire 
Protection Assn, describes a smokeproof enclosure as a 
stairway which is accessible via a vestibule open to the out­
side and on an exterior wall of a building. If this concept 
is followed literally, core type buildings could not be con­
structed unless a considerable area of the building was used 
to carry a corridor to an exterior wall and vestibule and 
Pamphlet 90A - Controls Section 
A.P. ROBINSON," 
Associate Member ASHRAE 
The technology involved in applying fire protection devices 
to air handling equipment utilizing ductwork systems is in 
its infancy. In both low- and high-rise buildings, there is 
a continuously growing concern regarding smoke inhalation 
and panic created from smoke situations. Pamphlet 90A 
suggests the application of devices to these systems to at­
tempt to lessen the hazards. There is a general disagreement 
among building owners and design engineers and the Na-
Smoke Control in High-Rise Buildings 
J.B.SEMPlE 
Member ASHRAE 
Fire destroys property. Smoke is the killer of SO% of "fire 
victims." Fire codes and regulations have been dictated in 
the light of property loss risks to the extent that personal 
safety is often hardly considered and sometimes even ex­
posed to greater hazards. Smoke from burning contempor­
ary furnishing materials has greatly increased life hazards 
without appreciably increasing property risks, not only by 
Can Spril1kler Systems Solve Buildi11g Code 
Problems? 
E.J. RElllY 
Automatic sprinkler systems for fire protection are discussed 
in terms of their relationship to building code problems. 
Construction costs. design for public safety. design Oexibil-
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semblies. restricted the ceding outlet to approximately 113 
sq in.!IOO sq ft of ceiling space. A few have used outlets 
IS-in. in diameter and have thus restricted the diffuser 
opening sizes to 254 sq in./1 00 sq ft of ceiling area. Cooper­
ative testing between the two Associations have made it pos­
sible for some ceiling assemblies to continue to be a "rated" 
floor-ceiling or roof-ceiling assembly with allowable open­
ing sizes to 24 by 24 in. sq or a 576 sq in. opening for 
each 100 sq ft of ceiling area. 
stairway were placed just inside an exterior wall. This can 
be quite expensive. Fire tests were conducted in buildings 
ready for demolition in an attempt to learn how mechanical 
systems could accomplish the same purpose. The system 
discussed involves supply and exhaust ventilation for the 
vestibule so that a negative pressure is developed. The stair­
way itself is vented but pressurized. 
tional Fire Protection Assn as to the feasability of the 
pamphlet recommendations. In the case of the high-rise 
building. this disagreement generally results in little or no 
protection. Low-rise buildings are quite often overprotected 
which needlessly adds to their construction costs. This 
paper is an attempt to outline what can be done now. wilh 
available equipment. 10 existing buildings and 10 planned 
buildings to lessen possibility of loss of life due to smoke. 
multiplying obscurity. but also by releasing addilional poi­
sonous products of partial combustion. These death hazards 
have been recognized by the National Fire Proteclion Assn 
Life Safety Code. but only in respect to hospitals and 
nursing homes. Total evacuation of any high-rise building 
in a reasonably safe period of time is impossible. yet that 
is the only life safety provision required in current codes. 
ity. and codes developed by the National Fire Protection • Assn arc discussed. A number of installations arc illustrated W 
in the talk. 
INTRODUCTION 
Symposium Chairmen 
A. G. WILSON 
Member ASHRAE 
W. A. SCHMIDT 
Member ASHRAE 
The first ASHRAE Symposium 1 on fire safety, held during 
the 1968 Annual Meeting, identified the importance of fire 
protection considerations for designers of air handling and 
other mechanical systems in bUildings. It also revealed the 
fact that there has been little participation by mechanical 
designers in the formulation of fire safety requirements and 
that there has been little opportunity for them to become 
expert in principles of fire protection or to make a con­
tribution toward improved design for fire safety. Following 
the first Symposium,  therefore, a decision was taken to 
establish a new ASHRAE Technical Committee on Fire 
Safety to cover the "development , collation and dissemina­
tion of information (through technical program, research 
and ASHRAE GUIDE AND DATA BOOK activity) on the 
application,  design and installation of environmental sys­
tems and components relative to requirements for protec­
tion of life and property from fire and smoke in buildings." 
The new Technical Committee became active in the fall 
of 1969 and since that time has sponsored two symposiums: 
Fire Hazards in Buildings2, and the present Symposium. 
The increasing interest of ASHRAE members in fire safety 
is clearly evident in the excellent attendance at both sympo­
siums and in participation in discussion from the floor. 
Designers are concerned about requirements related to 
hazards created by air handling systems, for example, 
requirements for fire dampers and other provisions of 
NFPA Standard 90 A. Some papers have dealt with these 
aspects. They have also expressed interest in the use of the 
air handling system to contribute to fire safety, particularly 
to control smoke concentrations in areas outside the im­
mediate fire compartment. A number of the papers have 
therefore dealt with the mechanisms of smoke movement 
and systems of smoke control. 
It is now recognized that the time needed for evacuation 
of high-rise buildings, or those with a very large plan area, 
is SUbstantial and that in such buildings it may be practi­
cable to evacuate occupants only in the immediate vicinity 
of the fire ; that it is necessary to ensure a tenable atmo­
sphere in routes of egress and in other parts of a building 
to be occupied during a fire. This is basically an environ­
mental control problem. It is, therefore, one in which 
members of ASHRAE should be keenly interested .  They 
should be able to make a major contribution to its solution. 
REFERENCES 
1. Symposium bulletin, Fire Hazards in Buildings and Air­
Handling Systems, from the ASHRAE Annual Meeting, 
June 24-26, 1968, Lake Placid, N. Y. 
2. Symposium bulletin, Fire Hazards in Buildings, from the 
ASHRAE Semiannual Meeting, January 19-22, 1970, 
San Francisco, Calif., published 1971. 
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CURRENT STATUS OF FIRE TESTING 
FLOOR/CEILING ASSEMBLIES WITH DUCT 
SYSTEMS AND OUTLETS 
R. G. SANDVI K 
The results of recent tests at the Underwriters' Laboratories 
(UL) in Northbrook, I ll . ,  provide new data involving the 
potential fire hazard characteristics of air distribution sys­
tems located in floor/ceiling or roof/ceiling assemblies. 
Analysis of the test data indicates that thermal protection 
of ducts by using fibrous glass acoustical duct lining and 
"board protection," or protecting the duct in the area of 
the outlet by covering it with standard mineral wood insula­
tion bats, will provide equivalent,  or better, fire protection 
than the us:! of a fire damper above a ceiling outlet. 
To properly evaluate the information that was gathered 
at this test, the difference between it and the test employed 
to evaluate fire dampers, must be recognized. 
The ut 555 Test Procedure is used for testing fire 
dampers, and is similar to, and derived from, the basic Fire 
Door Test, American Society of Testing and Materials 
(ASTM) E-152. 
The floor/ceiling assemblies are tested according to the 
procedure outlined in the standard "Fire Test of Building 
Construction and Materials," UL 263, which is basically the 
same test as ASTM E-119 or NFPA #254. Both the hori­
zontal fire dampers and the floor/ceiling assemblies are 
tested in the same large scale, 180 sq ft, furnace. Both tests 
utilized the standard time temperature curve that requires 
furnace temperatures of 1700 F (926 C) at one hour, 
1850 F (1010 C) at 2 hrs and 2000 F (1093 C) at 4 hrs. 
It is important to establish the difference between the 
two tests. The floor/ceiling test (UL 263) evaluates the 
ability of a specific assembly to retard the transmission of 
heat during a specified period of time. The specific period 
of time (the hourly rating assigned to the ceiling material, 
e.g., 1 hr, 1 � hrs, 2 hrs, 3 hrs or 4 hrs) is that time that the 
assembly does not exceed the temperature limits set by the 
test procedure. The hourly rating assigned to the assembly 
is normally applied to the membrane ceiling material em­
ployed. This hourly classification reflects the fact that the 
particular assembly withstood the test for that particular 
period of time or, more generally, surpassed that period of 
time. 
The fire damper tests (UL 555) tests the ability of a me­
chanical item to inhibit flame penetration during a pre­
determined time period, with no requirement or considera­
tion of heat transmission. 
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The criteria of the floor/ceiling assembly test requires 
that during the fire endurance test the transmission of heat 
through the test construction shall not raise the tempera­
ture of its unexposed surface more than 250 F (130 C) 
above its initial temperature, and the transmission of heat 
through the protection shall not raise the average tempera­
ture of the structural steel system employed above 1000 F 
(538 C) at any one of the four sections, nor raise the tem­
perature above 1200 F at any one of the measured points. 
A fire damper is only required to stay in place during 
the fire test, and to show no other visible through openings 
than those provided for operating clearances that were 
visible when viewed on a plan perpendicular to the mount­
ing plane prior to the test . Openings between blades, or' 
blades and frame, shall not exceed % in. during or after the 
fire endurance test and 1 in. during or after the hose stream 
test. All latching mechanisms, shafts, springs, interlocking 
damper blades, etc. shall remain engaged and secure during 
the fire exposure and hose stream test. In addition, me­
chanical tests are performed to assure closing reliability 
after dust loading and salt spray exposure. 
When a fire damper is tested, it is subjected to a hose 
stream test immediately following the shut-down of the 
furnace. The hose stream provides a rapid cooling and 
generally creates a condition that causes the damper com­
ponents to warp, sometimes beyond the limits allowable. 
Any visual gaps are then measured to determine whether or 
not they exceed the limits established for the test. 
Fire dampers are not tested in ducts, or under any con­
dition of air movement other than the slight negative 
operating pressure for which test furnaces arc generally 
designed. UL 555 requires that the fire dampers be in­
stalled in a wall, or reinforced concrete floor slab, using a 
sleeve arrangement to provide means for attaching the duct­
work on either side, leaving the fire damper independently 
installed in the fire partition or floor slab .  The fire dampers 
must be firmly attached to the sleeve and the sleeve is 
allowed to extend a few inches beyond each side of the 
wall, or slab, to allow ductwork and retaining angles to be 
attached. The retaining angles arc not fastened to the build­
ing structure - they must be allowed to move when the 
damper expands from the application of heat. 
Generally speaking, fire dampers are labeled for I Yz hrs, 
although testing procedures do allow for a 1 hr, or a % hr 
rating. The lesser time ratings compare to those used for 
fire doors . 
The time rating that is given either the floor/ceiling or 
roof/ceiling assembly, or the fire dampers, is based upon 
the amount of time required to reach any one of the several 
limits as determined by the test procedure being used. In 
the case of floor/ceiling assemblies the temperatures are the 
limiting factors. When fire dampers are tested, the dimen­
sions of the openings determine whether or not a rating will 
be allowed. The time of exposure without exceeding the 
dimensional limitations establishes the rating in hours. 
To meet UL requirements, ceiling manufacturers gener­
ally use a conservative approach. Electric light fixtures are 
covered with insulating material, such as the ceiling board. 
To minimize the heat transfer through diffuser penetrations 
of the ceilings the minimum sized air openings are em­
ployed. Air handling ceiling outlet sizes are restricted, 
usually to 13 in. round drops, and insulated "Flapper 
Dampers" are installed in the duct over the outlet. 
The Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' 
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Fig. 1 Typical joist temperatures bottom chord 
Acoustical and Insulation Materials Association (AIMA) 
has participated in the fire testing of a typical floor/ceiling 
assembly to provide substantiating data that would: 
I. permit larger ceiling openings for air handling systems 
and 
2. develop alternate methods of protecting the ceiling 
penetration in floor/ceiling fire rated assemblies. 
The first test, sponsored by AIMA and co-sponsored by 
SMACNA, was performed early in January 1970 and com-
pared a 24 in. X 24 in. ceiling diffuser to a 12 in. diameter 
ceiling diffuser. Fig. I gives a typical joist temperature 
reading at a comparative point for the two openings during 
the first 2 hrs of the test. 
They were subjected to the same fire conditions in a 
split-frame test. In both outlets the assembly included a 
flat metal insulated damper that dropped over the top of 
the opening when a fusible link melted. The average tem­
perature rise of the larger opening was within 5 to 10 min 
of the smaller opening during the entire test. Some floor/ 
ceiling assemblies that withstood the UL 263 test for 10 or 
15 min longer than the hourly rating assigned to it may
, 
qualify to use the larger opening, provided that other engi­
neering adjustments have not reduced the extra time to a 
minimum. 
A second test, sponsored by SMAcNA and co-sponsored 
by AIMA, was undertaken in July of 1970 utilizing the 
identical floor/ceiling assembly" including the acoustical 
tile from the same manufactured lot as the January test. 
The purpose of the second test was to illustrate the effect 
of removing the "damper" protection used in the first test, 
and substituting a method of insulation, to provide or 
maintain the heat resistant qualities of the assembly. 
Again a split frame assembly was used, dividing the 180 
sq ft furnace into two sections of 90 sq ft each, in a fashion 
identical to the January test that employed "damper" pro­
tection. In the second test, with the damperiess protection, 
both outlets were 24 in. X 24 in. The first test utilized 
plain steel duct without any acoustical treatment. In the 
second test, both openings were protected by insulating the 
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line of the opening. One side of the furnace u tilized fibrous 
glass acoustical duct lining inside the duct, with acoustical 
ceiling board laid on top of the duct. The other side of the 
furnace used a plain steel duct with 4 ft of 1 � in. thick 
mineral wool bats (a common wall insulating material) 
centered over the top of the opening, and extending a few 
inches on each side of the duct, supporting two vertical 
pieces of 1 � in. thick mineral wood bats, that provided the 
protection on the side of the duct , from the top of the duct 
down to the top surface of the ceiling tile as illustrated in 
Fig. 2 .  
The heat transfer data, for these damperless forms of 
duct outlet protection, indicated that the assembly incor­
porating the fibrous glass acoustic duct lining with the 
addition of acoustical ceiling board on the top of the duct, 
developed slightly lower plenum temperatures throughout 
the I ¥z hr duration of this test, than the assembly in the 
first test that utilized an insulated damper inside of the 
duct. 
Unfortunately, the assembly that utilized the mineral 
wool bat protection for the duct outlet did not have the 
opportunity to perform as well as expected, due to a 
failure of the installing crew to properly fasten one channel 
supporting the tile ceiling. * The ceiling on this side opened 
within a few minutes after the test began and eventually 
dropped several ceiling tiles into the furnace. Despite this 
failure at the end of 95 min the plenum temperatures 
averaged well under 1 000 F on both sides of the furnace. 
Temperatures on the unexposed surface were more than 
100 F less than the allowable maximum temperature. 
Directly above the center of each opening a thermo­
couple was placed on top of the steel duct, underneath 
the acoustical tile on one side, and underneath the 
mineral wool bat on the other side. While the temperature 
of the metal surface inside the duct that was unlined 
measured approximately 1 500 F at 90 min, the temperature 
reading was about 1 075  F at the same location on the other 
duct which was protected by the acoustical fiberglass duct 
lining. At this particular moment the fire in the furnace was 
registering about 1 785  F. It appears that a fiberglass lined 
duct will, of itself, provide considerable fire protection. 
Temperature curves for these two thermocouples are 
illustrated in Fig. 2 .  
Historically, fire dampers have been required for many 
years. I believe NFPA Standard Codes as far back as 1 927 
call for fire dampers where a duct passed through a required 
fire partition. Obviously, early statistics from the fire 
reports showed that fire was traveling from one side of a 
required fire partition to the other where ducts pierced the 
partition. Fire reports did not indicate whether the fire 
went through the ducts, or around the ducts. The com­
mittee working on air conditioning obviously felt that these 
openings should be sealed up to protect the integrity of the 
partition, and added the requirement for fire dampers. 
It may be that the fires went around the ducts rather 
than through the ducts, since most contractors would chop 
a hole through the wall large enough for their ductwork to 
pass through with "ample" clearance. Since the ductwork 
"'Another test of this assembly was performed after the January 
1971 ASHRAE Meeting where this material was presented. The 
latest test was performed on February 26, 1971 and was apparently 
successful OJ'er a full 4 hour test pcriod. 
8 
was to be concealed by a dropped ceiling and would not be 
visible after the acoustical ceiling was installed, they did 
not bother to seal the wall around the ducts. This condi­
tion would obviously greatly increase the danger of fire 
transmission across these walls. 
For many years the only definition of a fire damper was 
an illustration that was shown in the NFP A 90A Code. 
Until 1 957  any damper that resembled the illustration in 
90A was accepted as a fire damper. In 1 957 one damper 
manufacturer invested in an Underwriters' Laboratories 
test. A damper that he felt would pass the 1 Yz hr fire test 
E 1 52 for fire doors, was tested and listed by the UL 
Listing and Inspection Service. Soon thereafter several 
other manufacturers also tested dampers and subscribed to 
the UL's Listing and Inspection Service to allow them to 
provide labeled fire dampers for the industry. The financial 
investment to cover the costs of the expensive testing 
required was passed on to the consumer of fire dampers, 
namely, the sheet metal contractor. In 1 965 SMACNA 
undertook the testing of the fire damper that was illustrated 
in 90A. The first multiple blade fire damper failed the test. 
With some minor changes, such as utilizing stainless steel 
shafts and bronze bearings, other tests were performed with 
vertically mounted fire dampers until a multiple blade 
damper did pass the UL test. Drawings for these tested fire 
dampers ,were made available to the industry to provide 
sheet metal contractors with a tested fire damper that could 
be labeled and supplied on short notice. Since that time 
several manufacturers of fire dampers have designed more 
economical fire dampers and it has become "big business." 
& 
All tested fire dampers should be installed in a manner 
similar to their installation for the fire test, to insure their 
staying in position during the fire . Installation instructions· _ 
are normally shipped with all fire dampers and alternate 
methods are illustrated in SMACNA's "Fire Damper Guide 
for Air Handling Systems." The basic fire hazard improve-
ment appears to be the installation method, which seals the 
fire damper sleeve in the wall and yet allows room for the 
fire damper and the duct to expand under fire conditions, 
without leaving gaps for the fire to penetrate to the other 
side of the fire partition. Until recently all fire dampers 
were tested for 1 Yz hrs. One rationalization of this pro­
cedure expressed to me was that if the steel could with­
stand the temperatures required by the Standard Time 
Temperature Curve for I Yz hrs, steel dampers would, in all 
probability, provide protection for a somewhat longer 
period of time. There was no requirement for fire dampers 
to withstand a longer period of time because NFP A 90A 
only requires them in a 2-hr fire partition, requiring fire 
doors in 3 or 4 hr fire walls. Recently, one fire damper 
manufacturer had his fire damper tested for the 3 Ius, and 
is permitted to affix a Class A 3-hr fire door label to this 
damper. Technically, two of these "fire doors" installed in 
a duct will probably satisfy the test requirements of NFPA 
90A for two Class A fire doors to be installed in a duct that 
pierces a 3 or 4 hr fire wall. 
So much for fire dampers. Now let us consider f1oor/ 
ceiling assemblies. Fire testing of floor/ceiling and roof/ 
ceiling assemblies is intended to provide fire safety Ihrounh 
horizontal compartmenlalization in containing fires frorn • 
spreading from floor 10 floor. Acoustical tile of a non- • 
combustible nature is employed, not only to conceal the 
structural members being utilized, but to protect the steel 
structural members from becoming heated beyond their 
failure point and, to insulate the floor above for a specific 
length of time. Originally tests were performed with cotton 
waste material on the floor above, and if the cotton waste 
material ignited, that ended the test and the rating allowed 
would depend upon the time lapse between the start of the 
fire and when the waste material ignited. This has been 
refined by the use of thermocouples and the current require­
ment is a maximum of 250 F deg temperature rise above 
the ambient temperature. Many air handling systems being 
used today utilize fibrous glass lined steel duct. This alone 
will provide considerable thermal protection to the floor/ 
ceiling assembly if the test results of the recent SMACNA/ 
AIMA UL Test are valid. Future tests, I am sure, will con­
firm this. Continuing testing of floor/ceiling assemblies 
which have means other than fire dampers to protect 
diffuser openings is presently under consideration. 
In your design work you should be aware of the differ­
ence between the tests employed for floor/ceiling or roof/ 
ceiling assemblies and those employed to test fire dampers. 
Hopefully, this presentation will help clarify some of the 
confusion that appears to exist as to what a fire damper is 




JOHN G. DEGENKOLB 
FEW fire protection requirements set forth in building code s  have c aused as much c ontrov ersy a s  t h e  
requirement for smoke proof enclosures. 
The term "smokeproof enclosure" describes a stair­
way designed to prevent quantities of smoke from entering 
the enclosure in such an amount as to make it untenable 
and unusable (Fig. 1). Historically, this has been ac­
complished by providing an intermediate vestibule be­
tween the building corridor and the stairway. The ves­
tibule must necessarily be open to the outdoor air on at 
least one side so that smoke accumulations in the corridor 
Building Ext ior 
Corridor 
Fig. J Smokeproof Enclosure 
will not move into the stair shaft to any considerable 
degree. Normally, about 50% of one side of the vestibule 
is to be open to the outdoor air. Both the Basic Building 
Code. and the Uniform Building Code call for a minimum 
opening of 16 sq ft. An alternate arrangement is to have 
the stairway accessible by way of a balcony. 
The building codes recommended by the American 
Insurance Assn (the National Building Code) and the 
Southern Standard Building Code do not require smoke­
proof enclosures, smoke towers. smokeproof towers-wha­
tever term you choose. Neither of these codes even men­
tions smokeproof enclosures. The National Fire Protection 
Assn (N FPA) Standard 101, Life Safety Code, describes 
the facility in detail. but. oddly enough. it does not require 
any occupancy to install one. 
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The Building Officials and Code Administrators Inter­
national (BOCA). formerly the Building Officials Confer­
ence of America, and the International Conference of 
Building Officials' Uniform Building Code, 1970 editions, 
both require smokeproof enclosures. In my opinion, the 
requirement i s  established on a proper and reasonable 
basis. Smokeproof enclosures are regarded not primarily 
as preferred exits. but rather as a fire-fighting tool-:-a real­
ly usable means of access for fire-fighting personnel to the 
upper stories of high-rise buildings. I believe there has 
been sufficient publicity and concern expressed in recent 
months to show that the needs of the fire services for 
built-in fire-fighting facilities have been seriously over­
looked. Smokeproof enclosures are just one of many fea­
tures which should be provided. 
Smokeproof enclosures. when specified. are required 
in buildings 75 ft or more in height. Both the Basic· and the 
Uniform Building Codes recognize that it is possible to 
meet the requirement by more than one method. But. in � 
other cases, individual cities and counties have dealt with· � 
smokeproof enclosure requirements in a number of ways. 
Typical of how codes vary in their requirements (Fig. 2): 
Building F.:.:tedor 
Corrldol'" 
� , ..... _;. 
Fig. 2 A Itemate Method of Prol'iding A Smokeproof Enclosure 
1 .  The vestibule is permitted to open upon a 50 sq ft 
court or smoke shaft. 
2. The vestibule is permitted to open upon a shaft 
having an area of 100 sq ft. with no minimum dimension 
specified. 
3. The vestibule is permitted to open on a court hav­
ing an area of 105 sq ft. with a minimum dimension of 7 ft. 
4. The vestibule is permitted to open on a court or 
shaft w ith a 200 or 300 s q  ft m ini mum area. with a 
minimum dimension of 10 ft. 
N one of these alternates has really been tested, and 
would not, i n  my opinion, accomplish the job. I think they 
would all worsen the situation where safe exiting is con­
cerned and would not provide a smoke-free stairway. 
An explanation of the reasons which I see behind the 
requirement for smokeproof enclosures may be of some 
help. Fire department ladders can be counted on to reach 
only the lower floors of a building. Under ideal conditions, 
a 100-ft aerial ladder could possibly reach the seventh 
floor. A snorkel can do no better. But, ideal conditions sel­
dom occur in building fires. Usually , the building is set 
back from the street; or the sidewalk is quite wide; or cars 
and trucks may be parked at the curb. So, the fire equip­
ment will probably have to be well out from the building. 
In most cases, when the aerial-ladder truck or snorkel is  
placed i n  position, the ladder will  not reach beyond the 
fifth floor. Up to the height which the ladder can reach, 
firemen will be able to get to the interior of the building in 
comparatively clear air. But, if the fire originates on an 
upper floor and a door is  kept open for a while, smoke will 
enter the stair shaft .  Or suppose that while trying to leave 
the fire area, and before smoke and heat make use of the 
corridor on the fire 'floor impossible, the stairway door is 
frequently opened and closed. In either case smoke enter­
ing the conventional enclosed stairway will rapidly render 
it impossible for use by anyone without special breathing 
equipment. An enclosed stairway normally is not vented. 
A small amount of smoke trapped in a stairway will soon 
make it untenable and unusable. 
A simple vent at the top of the stairwell is not the an­
swer because, as was shown in the extensive full-scale 
bui ldi ng fire test s ,  report e d  in the NF P A  pub licati on 
"Operation School Burning," smoke wi ll not ascend the 
shaft until it is adequately warmed. Firemen entering the 
stairwell will have to contend with smoke all the way from 
the g ro u nd floor u p  t o  the fi r e  fl oo r .  At p re s e nt , fi re 
department s  d o  not h av e  s uffici ent breathing apparatus  
available to  supply each fireman with personal equipment. 
Even if such gear was provided, the capacity of the air or 
oxygen tanks would probably not be of sufficient capacity 
to last beyond the time needed to reach the fire floor. The 
air or oxygen would be nearly exhausted before the actual 
fire-fighting could get underway. If firemen in good physi­
cal condition are to reach the upper stories of high-rise 
buildings in good enough shape to carry on efficient fire­
fighting and rescue operations, they must be able to reach 
the fire floor through a comparatively smoke-free atmos­
phere. That-and not to serve as a super-exit-is the real 
purpose of the smokeproof enclosure. Obviously, other 
steps are being taken or are under consideration to take 
care o f  the exc eptio nally high bui ldi n g s. D uri ng t h e  
famous New York blackout of a few years ago, it was nec­
essary for firemen to climb 40 and more stories to reach a 
reported fire-and that's not good even for a man in per­
fect condition. But , across the nation such buildings are 
not most prevalent; the "average" are 10- to 25-stories. 
Certainly, a smokeproof enclosure would be a superi­
or exit for those occupants who were fortunate enough to 
reach that particular stairway.  But, the chances that a per­
son will reach that particular stairway cannot possibly be 
better than 50-50, and may well be but one in three, one 
in four, or even worse. It is also quite likely that the 
smokeproof stairway will have heavy "up" traffic since it 
is the one specifically provided for the use of fire depart­
ment and "down" traffic might be heavily impeded. 
It is my opinion that the smokeproof enclosure must 
be regarded as simply another fire-fighting tool in the same 
category as the dry standpipe, the combination standpipe, 
the annunciator panel which designates the location of a 
fire, emergency elevator operation, etc., also required for 
tal ler  bui lding s .  I f  we were t o  regard th e smokeproof 
enclosure primarily as a preferred exit for occupants of the 
building, then the codes should require that all stairways 
be of the smokeproof type. 
It is my contention that the conventional smokeproof 
enclosure, as described in N FP A 10 1 ,  is not infallable. 
Adverse weather conditions, wind, etc. ,  may inhibit the es­
cape of smoke through the vestibule open to the outdoor 
air .  Act u al ly ,  the smokeproof'enclosure described has 
never really been tested. 
In recent years, there has been an increasing demand 
on the part of architect s and buildi ng owners for the 
"core-type" building-one in which the central area or 
core encompasses the elevators, stairways, service rooms, 
utility shafts,  etc. With such a design, less space is needed 
for corridors which would be otherwise required to pro­
vide access to stairways necessarily located on the perime­
ter of the building or around a sizable "wasted area" shaft 
or court . Core-type design provides more perimeter offices 
and an overall increase in the amount of space available 
for rental. Some architects estimate that as much as 10% 
more space will be made avai lable (but that doesn't really 
seem possible) .  Th e arguments i n  fav or of eliminating 
smokeproof enclosure s  sound convi ncing . But ,  proper 
access to upper stories of the building for purposes of res­
cue and fire suppression is vital and is urgently needed. 
As a result of the pressures applied for the elimination 
of the smokeproof enclosures, accessible only by way of 
v esti bules  open to the outdoor ai r, vari o u s  sub stit ute 
methods have been proposed and accepted-most without 
benefit of test. In one jurisdiction, the installation of an air 
duct was required adjacent to the vestibule leading to the 
stairway.  No mechanical air movement was provided, only 
natural ventilation. In another, an air shaft approximately 
16 sq ft in area was provided along one side of the ves­
tibule. The shaft extended from grade to roof and was sep­
arated from the walking area of the vestibule only by a 
screen serving both as a pedestrian guard and as a means 
of allowing smoke to escape, hopefully without allowing 
smoke to enter the stair shaft. Not only did neither of 
these methods work as proposed but instead worked in 
reverse, forcing smoke into the stairway. One county ac­
cepted another substitute method calling for mechanical 
ventilation of the vestibule, but no forced ventilation of the 
st air shaft itse lf. Smoke ent ering that stai rway has no 
means of escape. The stairway has a musty smell and it is  
difficult to  rid the shaft of  odors. 
This matter was brought to a head in San Diego when 
the Board of Appe a l s  required the B u i lding and Fire 
Depts to establish an alternate method of providing the 
smokeproof enclosure. This is a switch because it is usual 
for the one ·seeking a variance to prove that his alternate is  
equivalent to  that which the code specifies. 
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The San Diego Fire Dept obtained the use of a four­
story hotel building soon to be demolished. A portion of 
the building was isolated for test purposes. Assistance in 
conducting the tests was obtained from the Los Angeles 
Fire Dept. Access to the stairway was from one direction 
only, simulating the end of a corridor. A door was pro­
vided to shut off the corridor from the v e s tibule and 
another door was placed between the vestibule and the 
stair shaft (Fig. 3). The vestibule was 46 in. wide and 54 
in. long. The doors into and out of the vestibule were 3 ft 
by 6 ft 8 i n. in size. Test fires were burned in a room 
opening onto the corridor which led to the vestibule. Test 
fires were made up of 35 Ibs of wood, 9 Ibs of asphalt­
based linoleum, and a small amount of flammable liquid to 
get the fires going quickly. Fires were burned in a dis­
carded bathtub, thereby restricting the amount of air so 
that dense smoke developed. Artificial smoke, such as is 
used in visibility tests, testing of refrigerated railroad cars, 
etc., was not considered suitable because, without accom­
panying heat, such smoke may not react characteristically .  
:------L 
t ---------+------w--+-y��------_, 
I Fire : Escape 
t 
L ____ _ 
Corridor 
Fire Reo. 
Fig. 3 San Diego Test 
Smoke detectors set to operate at a 4% reduction in a 
I-ft long beam of white light were installed and connected 
to automatic door-releasing devices to hold the vestibule 
and stair shaft doors open when the tests so required. 
Various levels of ventilation were provided for the 
vestibule. A vestibule exhaust outlet, 7 5  sq in. in size, was 
installed lOin. above the floor. This vent was available as 
needed for various tests. In the stair shaft wall at the sec­
ond floor level, an inlet air opening, approximately 220 sq 
in. in size, was placed 3 ft above the floor. A blower was 
provided for this opening to be used as needed. At the top 
of the stair and adjacent to the door to the roof was a 
double-hung window that could be opened or closed as 
needed. 
A thermocouple was provided in the fire test room 
and placed above the tub so that heat measurements could 
be taken in order to determine whether the heat produced 
would effect the smoke emission. Smoke density measur­
ing equipment composed of a photo-electric cell and 
an electric light source was installed in the hallway outside 
the vestibule, in the vestibule itself, and at the top of the 
stair shaft in the penthouse area. Manometers were in­
stalled in the vestibule and in the stair shaft. Blowers were 
used to move the air as desired. The stair shaft blower, 
rated at 5000 cfm, could be adjusted by varying the size of 
the opening through which the air entered the stair shaft. 
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Variou s arrangements of air move me nts-gravity, 
forced, negative p re s s ure , p ositive p re ssure, etc ., were 
tried. Most were unsuccessful, but not all. It was found 
that when a negative pressure was established within the 
vestibule and a positive pressure within the stair shaft, the 
stairway could be kept acceptably clear of smoke. 
A s  the re sult  of the se experi ments ,  the Uni form 
Building Code was amended to permit the installation of 
either of two types of smokeproof enclosures, the naturally 
vented vestibule or open air balcony access to the stair­
way and the mechanically operated enclosure. The smoke­
p roof enclos u re attained by mechanical ventilation i s  
required t o  meet the following requirements (Fig 4): 
I. The opening between the corridor and the vestibule 
is  to be protected by an approved I 1 /2-hr fire assembly. 
The door is to be automatic closing upon the detection of 
products of combustion other than heat. The door between 
the vestibule and the stairway is to be a tight-fitting door 
equal to not less than an exterior type solid wood door 
without voids, assembled with exterior type glue, I 3/4 in. 
minimum thickness, mounted in a steel frame. Wired glass 
set in steel frames shall not exceed 1 00 sq in. in area. The 
door to the stairway is  to be provided with a drop sill and 
other arrangements made, such as weather stripping, to 
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Fig 4 Smokeproof Enclosure Attained by Mechanical Ventilation 
2. The vestibule must be a minimum of 44 by 72 in. 
in size . 
3. The vestibule must be provided with not less than 
I air change per min and the exhaust must be a minimum 
of 150% of the supply. Vestibule supply air must enter 
and exhaust air must leave the vestibule through separate 
tighly constructed ducts used only for that purpose. Sup­
ply air must enter the vestibule within 6 in. of the floor 
level. The top of the exhaust register must be located at 
the top of a smoke trap, but no more than 6 in. down from 
top of that trap and be entirely within smoke trap area. 
4. There is a requirement that the vestibule ceiling 
shall be at least 20 in. higher than the top of the door 
opening into the vestibule. This serves as the smoke and 
heat trap previously mentioned. For some reason, this was 
essential to the satisfactory movement of air in the ves­
tibule and apparently results in the development of an 
upward moving air column within the vestibule. 
5 .  Doors, when in the open posItIOn, must not ob­
struct duct openings. Duct openings may be provided with 
controlling dampers, if needed, to meet the design require­
ments, but they are not otherwise required. (At this point, a 
special note is added to the text of the Code. This was 
done to satisfy a specific requirement deemed necessary 
by the Los Angeles Fire Dept to meet a specific unex­
plained need.  The Los Angeles Fire Dept conducted some 
additional tests of i ts own. To the best of my knowledge, it  
obtained no results different from those attained in the San 
Diego tests. But, Los Angeles City requires  that the "stair 
shaft exhaust ventilation shall be by mechanical means 
and not less than 2500 cfm out of the top opening with 
any three adjacent vestibules in operation and with their 
doors open. Average local wind conditions shall be consid­
ered. The vestibule mechanical exhaust shall be a mini­
mum of 2500 cfm measured with the door to the stair 
shaft open. With the vestibule doors closed, a pressure dif­
ferential shall be maintained of not less than . 1 00 in.  water 
column below the minimum stair shaft pressure measured 
at that floor. Mechanical devices shall be installed to con­
trol airflow in each vestibule. The total capacity of the 
vestibule exhaust system is to be adequate to operate 
three vestibules simultaneously, measured with their doors 
to the building interior, open." In other words, a minimum 
7 500 cfm e xhaust must be provided. If only one vestibule 
is in operation, that would mean an air change of approxi­
mately 30 per min. When two vestibules go into operation, 
there would be 1 5  changes per min, and if all three ves­
tibules were in operation, there would be 1 0  air changes 
per m i n . Ele ctroni caI Iy ope rated dampers  w o u l d  b e  
required in each vestibule, s o  arranged that they would be 
closed at all times until a detector signalled the opening of 
the damper on the fire floor. I think the Los Angeles City 
system is unnecessarily complicated, overly sophisticated, 
and of questionable dependability with the passing of the 
years. But, the Uniform Building Code does not prohibit 
such an installation if the designer wants to install it .) 
6. The stair shaft must be provided with mechanical 
supply and exhaust air. There must be a minimum of 2500 
cfm discharge at the top of the stair shaft. The supply 
must be sufficient to provide a minimum of .05 in. water 
column pressure with respect to atmospheric pressure with 
all doors closed and a minimum of . 1 0  in. water column 
difference between the stair shaft and the vestibule. ( I  
would like t o  make it very clear that building codes are 
necessarily minimum. If the design should provide a pres­
sure differential of more than . 1 0  between the vestibule 
and the stair shaft, that is all to the good. If you are worri­
ed that a great pressure differential will inhibit the opening 
of a door. we tried a situation with .39 in. of water column 
difference between the stairway with a pressure at the 
knob location varying from 1 6  to 32 Ibs.) 
7. Exit doors into both the vestibule and the stair shaft 
may be held open with approved door holders of the fail-safe 
type. which wi ll pennit the door to close automatically when 
released by a detector of products of combustion other 
than heat. The detector is to be located in the corri dor on 
the . ceiling opposite the door to the vestibule. The opera­
ti on of t hat dete c tor s hall  also se t the vest ibule a n d  
stair shaft mechanical equipment into operation. Some of-
fici al s want the blowers to opera te conti n uou sly at a 
reduced level and then go to full capacity when the detec­
tors are activated. 
8. The mechanical ventilation equipment shall be pro­
vided with an approved self-contained generator which will 
go into operation automatically whenever there is a loss of 
power in the nonnal house current. The generator must be­
in a separate room of fire-resistive construction and have a 
minimum fuel supply adequate to operate the equipment 
for 2 hrs. 
It is extremely important that a test be conducted of 
the system before it is accepted. The use of mechanical 
or artificial smoke is satisfactory for this test. 
The present requiremen ts specify that in buildings 
with air-conditioning systems or pressure air supply, a 
products-of-combustion detector shall be pl�ce� in the �e­
turn air duct prior to exhausting from the bulldmg or bemg 
diluted by outdoor air. It shall -be so located as to operate 
and shut off the building system in the fire area in case of 
smoke in the air stream. Recently, there have been some 
second thoughts on this matter of shutting down the sup­
ply air and I think it might be more appropriate to main­
tain the air, continue the exhaust operation and bypass the 
return air so as to remove it from the building. This is still 
subject to debate and it is not consistent with what the 
code now specifies nor with requirements of N FP A 90A. 
The Basic Building Code was -modified in 1 970 to 
come into quite close agreement with the requirements of 
the Unifonn Building Code. The Basic Building Code does 
require greater fire-resistive construction of the shaft walls. 
It will still permit the natural ventilation system, but with 
the vestibule opening into a 1 0-ft minimum dimension 200 
sq ft area. The mechanically operated vestibule would 
require 2 air changes per min instead of the 1 per min 
called for in the Uniform Building Code. 
Both the Unifonn and Basic Building Codes require 
that the stairway emergency lighting be connected to the 
emergency generator. While the Unifonn Building Code 
does not specifically require an annunciator panel at the 
main entrance to the building, as does the Basic Building 
Code, each building, with which I am acquainted, using 
the mechanical system does have that panel. The Basic 
Code requires the building engineer to keep a log of tests 
conducted at least once e ve ry 30 d ay s. The U ni form 
Building Code people thought this was beyond the scope 
of a Code requirement. 
I am convinced that the mechanically operated system 
is feasible, dependabie and even preferable to the natural 
ventilation type smokeproof enclosure. I believe that it  
would be fairly effective if only because of the dilution 
provided by the stair shaft ventilation. I am opposed to the 
so-called Los Angeles City system because it is too com­
plicated and requi re s  u n li sted e lectronically ope rated 
dampers in each vestibule.  I have serious doubts about the 
proper operation of that system after 1 0  or 20 years. 
During the testing of some of these installations, I 
have encountered problems, i .e. motors not running to 
speed, the specified air delivery no being delivered, blow­
ers running in reverse, etc. But, in so doing I did learn that 
e ve n  w he n  the vest ibule  sy s te m s  did not  operate a s  
required. but with the stair shaft having the required air 
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movement, there actually was a pretty good condition. 
Possibly, the amount of air supplied and exhausted was 
sufficiently to dilute the smoke to such a degree that the 
stairway was usable. This dilution would not be present in 
the conventional natural ventilation type smokeproof en­
closure nor would it be present in the typical enclosed 
s tairway . As a result,  some bui lding officials  and fire 
marshals who have witnessed the tests are now requesting 
that stair shaft ventilation be provided even in the ordinary 
enclosed stairway-the one without a vestibule. 
According to a recent article, the Russians have been 
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doing some testing using scale models of buildings. There 
has been no correlation made with an actual building. The 
drawings accompanying the article showed that air was 
being supplied from the top of the model, but they don't 
show where it goes. In essence, the article indicates that 
air dilution may be satisfactory to accomplish a reduction 
in the temperature build-up to an acceptable level. 
The Canadians have done extensive research along 
this line and have apparently arrived at other solutions 
which will accomplish the same end results. 
But, there is still work to, be done. 
& 
PAM PH LET 90A CONTROLS SECTION 
A. P. ROBINSON 
Associate Member ASHRAE 
Pamphlet 90A is a pUblication of the National Fire Protec­
tion Association (NFPA). The most current edition was 
published in July, 1 97 1 .  To some, 90A is a design guide, 
and to others, its recommendations are law. Since the 
pamphlet has been revised 1 9  times since 1 937,  it is always 
important to make certain that the edition you are using is 
current and that the current edition is locally adopted. 
Pamphlet 90A assists in identifying the additional fire 
safety practices needed for an air-conditioned building as 
opposed to a non-air-conditioned building. The topics dis­
cussed in the pamphlet are as follows: Construction of 
Ducts; air intakes and outlets; air filters; fans; electric wiring 
and equipment ; air cooling and heating equipment ;  auto­
matic fire doors and dampers; controls; maintenance; and 
smoke removal. 
Specifically this paper will discuss the controls and the 
smoke removal sections. This discussion will follow the 
90A theme of providing a m inimum requirement for safety 
to life and property from fire, d iscuss what 90A recom­
mends, and perhaps clear-up some misinterpretations of the 
recommendations. Pamphlet 90A discusses fan systems of 
certain cfm of air deliverance capability. In all cases, it is 
valid to say that a fan system's delivery cfm is made up of 
the total cfm's of each fan attached to the supply side of 
the system.  In other words, an air conditioning unit with 
three 5000 cfm supply air fans is classified as an air-condi­
tioning system of 1 5 ,000 cfm. 
Pamphlet 90A requires that each air-conditioning sys­
tem have a conveniently located manual emergency stop 
switch in order to shutdown the fan in case of fire. The 
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� Fig. I Small Fan System showing two possible locations of the 
required emergency fan stop switch 
local authority having jurisdiction provides ultimate ap­
proval for the switch location. 
In a small fan system, (see Fig. 1 j, the equipment room 
is generally located adjacent to the area served by the unit. 
If there is no lock for the equipment room door, then per­
haps the air-conditioning unit fan motor starter disconnect 
switch would serve well as a manual emergency stop switch. 
A person would need only go to the equipment and shut 
off the fan if either a fire or a smoke condition were ob­
served.  This simple solution depends upon : ( l )  An un­
locked equipment room which doesn't often occur. More 
often than not, small equipment rooms are used for main­
tenance storage of mops, etc. and are consequently locked.  
(2) Occupants knowing the location of the air conditioning 
unit fan motor starter switch, how to use it, and importance 
of using it. 
This solution is offered because it  is the most com­
monly used solution, and it is economical. On the other 
hand, it is obvious that a person observing a quantity of 
smoke pouring out of a supply diffuser will have little to 
motivate him to go into an equipment room and shut off a 
fan. A person's primary motivation in such a circumstance 
would be escape. If the emergency switch is located along 
an exit route, then perhaps an excited occupant would 
activate it as he went past . 
In looking at the more complex air-conditioning system 
with more than one area being served by the air-condi­
tioning unit, it becomes most apparent that the fan motor 
starter disconnect switch is going to be unsatisfactory as a 
manual emergency fan stop switch (see Fig. 2). Some 
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Fig. 2 Large Fan System showing floor emergency stop switches 
located at entrance to exit way and at air,conditioning unit 
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( 1 )  Many people don't know where their particular 
floor lighting panel is located, much less the loca­
tion of the motor control center which houses the 
air-conditioning unit fan motor starter.  
(2)  Most equipment rooms are kept locked in large 
buildings. 
(3) The motor starting equipment is remote from the 
area served by the air-conditioning equipment and is 
not generally on the way to an exit. 
The conclusion is: If it is important for building occu­
pants to be able to shut down their air-conditioning-systems 
upon sensing fire or smoke, then it is necessary for the dis­
comiect switch to be located in the area served by the air­
conditioning unit. It is felt that they are a good device to 
use as a first stage in the protection of area occupants and 
property from fire and smoke damage and associated panic 
and loss of life . Hopefully , Pamphlet 9 0A will elaborate its 
recommendations with regard to these switches. Since 90A 
allows local authorities having jurisdiction to determine 
switch location, there is considerable non-uniformity. 
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Fig. 3 Small Air·Handling Unit 2000 to 15, 000 cJm with required 
heat detectors 
Air-conditioning systems whose total fan delivery cfm is 
between 2000 cfm and 1 5 ,000 cfm are required by 
Pamphlet 90A to be provided with Underwriters Labora­
tories (UL) approved thermostatic devices (see Fig. 3). One 
device is to be located in the air-conditioning unit return 
air stream prior to either exhausting or outdoor air dilution. 
This device is to be set for 1 2 5 F. If the air-conditioning 
unit does not utilize return air, then the exhaust device, if 
provided, should have a thermostat located in its suction. 
Another device is to be located in the air-conditioning unit 
supply air stream, down stream from the last filter section. 
This device is to be set for 5 0  F above the highest expected 
discharge air temperature. Either device, upon sensing set 
point temperature, is to be arranged to stop the unit fan. 
The devices are to be of the manual reset type or con­
nected to a fire alarm system requiring manual reset. 
Pamphlet 9 0A allows the SUbstitution of smoke detectors 
approved for duct installation in lieu of using thermostatic 
devices (see Fig. 4). Unless the end user of the area served 
by the air-conditioning unit or the local authority having 
jurisdiction recognizes a pronounced need for early warn­
ing, it would not be expected that smoke detectors would 
be substituted for thermostatic devices on these 2000 to 
1 5,000 units. An installed duct mounted smoke detector 
with fan shut-down contacts costs many times more than 
an installed manual reset type fire thermostat. If  it is im­
portant to life or property safety for certain 2000 to 
I S  ,000 cfm units to utilize sm oke detectors, then the 
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Fig. 4 Small Air·Handling Unit 2000 to 15,000 cJm with substitute 
smoke detectors 
NFP A may have to specifically identify those applications. 
The task of identification has been begun in Pamphlet 90A 
which recommends smoke detection in systems of 1 5 ,000 
and under where the panic hazard is pronounced or where 
there are valuable contents which are particularly subject to 
smoke damage. Smoke detectors are listed in the UL's Fire 
Protection Equipment List. Two categories of smoke de­
tectors are listed: ( 1 )  combustion products type and (2) 
photo-electric type. Current trends in the detection industry 
are moving away from the photo-electric type and seem to 
be permanently leaning towards the use of the combustion 
products type. Either type properly installed and main­
tained does a satisfactory job of detection. There are 
numerous manufacturers of both types of detectors listed 
in the UL's Fire Protection Equipment List. 
Pamphlet 90A requires the use of smoke detectors 
arranged for fan shut-down in air-conditioning systems 
whose total fan cfm is 1 5,000 or more (see Fig. 5 ). The 
recommended location of the detectors in these larger fan 
systems is the same as the location of the thermostatic 
devices in the smaller 2000 to 1 5 ,000 cfm systems. These 
larger systems present problems in the application of smoke 
detectors. The detectors are placed directly in the units or 
use sampling tube assemblies which allow the detector to 
be mounted outside the unit. In some instances, the de­
tectors are placed in both locations. The combustion 
products type, not unlike the photo-electric type, depends 
upon the products of combustion or smoke being brought 
into the detector area of influence before an alarm or action 
can be initiated. Multiple detectors are essential where 
stratification is suspected. Where pure mixture is proven, 
then multiple detectors do not appear to speed detection. 
The most commonly used answer to the dilution problem 
is the location of detectors in the hazard area. 
The detector in the supply air detects smoke or prod ucts 
of combustion coming from a fire within the unit , or 
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smoke or products of combustion being brought in from 
the outside. I know of an unprotected high rise building in 
the Middle A tlantic states which was pumped half full of 
undetected smoke from a fire outside the building. 
Pamphlet 90A recommends the use of smoke dampers 
on units over 1 5 ,000 cfm (see Fig. 6). These dampers are 
to be located in the supply duct work system and in the 
return duct work system where they would do the most 
good in sealing the unit against the natural flow of smoke 
after the air fans are shut down. There has been a lot of 
publicity given to the fact that the UL does not have a 
smoke damper listing. I t  may take a long time for criteria 
to be developed to have such a listing. During the interim 
period, the use of required automatic control type dampers 
in the return duct work and in the supply duct work ar­
ranged to shut  when the fan stops will suffice to do the job. 
The return air damper is a usually required damper so only 
the supply damper is additional. Additional controls are 
required on the normally open return air damper to close it 
when the unit fan is shut  down due to smoke detection 
which activates emergency fan disconnect switch. 
EXHAUST 
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Fig. 6 Large A ir·Handling Unit o ver 15,000 clm with reqllired 
smoke dampers and smoke detectors 
Units which serve more than one floor of a multi-floor 
building present smoke detection design problems. The 
detector in the supply duct makes sense due to unit fires 
and smoke from outside sources. The detector in the return 
air is given a tremendous monitoring job. As the units grow 
in size and return cfm , then it becomes more apparent that 
due to dilution by clean air from non-fire areas, a major 
fire in a multi-story building might grow undetected by an 
air-conditioning unit return air smoke detector. To be sure, 
the detector would operate before the entire return air duct 
work system were full of smoke which was the 90A reason 
for having it there. Too often people expect area protection 
from detection systems installed to prevent the recircula­
tion of smoke or products of combustion. Pamphlet 90A 
was not written as a guide for the installation of area detec­
tion systems. Perhaps someday, the NFPA will outline 
guides for area ·protection. 
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Fig. 7 MlIlti-Zone Unit over 15,000 clm with reqllired smoke de­
tectors and smoke dampers 
Multi-zone units in the over 1 5 ,000 cfm category present 
problems in the application of supply air smoke detection 
(see Fig. 7). It  is not economically feasible to install a de­
tector in each zone, consequently, a detector is normally 
installed in the fan suction or immediate discharge. If the 
hot deck has heating apparatus, which is hazard suspect 
then the deck itself should also be protected . Care must be 
exercised in using ionization type detectors in such decks 
if products of combustion are normally in the deck due to 
the heating apparatus. Due to cost and construction diffi­
culties, smoke dampers in the supply are not usually 
installed in multi-zone units or large built-up high velocity 
double duct units. 
Instead of fan shut-down, the pamphlet allows the use of 
the air-conditioning apparatus to purge the building of 
smoke. The pamphlet does not recommend such purge 
systems, it only allows them . It does not outline the 
methods to be used in the arrangement of the air-condi­
tioning apparatus, it merely cautions the user against com­
promising the air-conditioning systems integrity by sub­
jecting it to temperatures and conditions for which it was 
not designed . Pamphlet 90A allows the use of purge sys­
tems if you can design one which meets your needs. 
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SMOKE CONTROL 
IN H IGH RISE BUILDINGS 
J .  BROOKS SEMP LE 
Member ASHRAE 
FIRE . . . the destroyer of property ; but as a threat to human life smoke is much more significant. Smoke is 
the killer of 85% of the so-called fire victims. When the fire 
gets to the smoke stage in a room within a building, the 
oxygen is depleted and the real threat to human lives 
begins. For example, visual ize a typical smoldering fire :  
the flame is not spreading. It  is under control i n  that there 
is no more oxygen; there is no more propagation of flames 
but the very lack of oxygen is what causes death. This 
condition, this smoke, this obscuration not only contrib­
utes a tremendous amount of panic but also has hidden in 
it many deadly toxic gases and the greatest asphyxiant of 
all, carbon monoxide (Fig. I ) .  
Fig. 1 
Depicted in Fig. 2 is the analysis of acrylic fibers 
under pyrolysis in its full meaning: not only combustion 
but also thermal degradation. Beginning with full oxygen 
supply and full combustion of acrylic fibers, a small , al· 
most insignificant, amount of nitrogen oxides are given off. 
However, as the room begins to fill with smoke, and more 
importantly as the oxygen becomes depleted, the quanti­
ties of nitrogen oxides are increased approximately three· 
fold and hydrocyanic acid is also released ( Fig. 3). This 
second agent is so deadly it is used for public execution in 
the State of California. 
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Finally, when all of the oxygen is depleted and ther· 
mal degradation is complete ( Fig. 4) not only are the first 
two elements greatly increased, quantitat ively, but also a 
third toxic element, menthane, is emitted . In addition to its 
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toxicity, menthane is well known as  an extremely volatile 
fuel. It is this package of deadly gases expanding under 
fire pressure which gradually forces its way out of the fire 
zone through the duct system, very frequently past fire 
dampers which are insensitive to the passage of these 
gases, into spaces still containing oxygen. Then all it takes 
is a small spark and the building blows up. It is not neces­
sary to have explosives in the building to have it explode. 
It is because of these toxic and explosive gases and 
carbon monoxide, given off from the infinite number of 
building materials and contents in a fire, that I wish to 
slress to the engineering fraternity the havoc smoke really 
causes. The fire fighting profession has been aware of this 
for years. It is high time the public  learns it as well. 
Concerning h ardware, smoke dampers are entering 
more and more into building plans. The National Fire Pro­
tection Assn's (NFPA) Standard 90A on Air Conditioning 
& Ventilating Systems stresses control of smoke in the fan 
room only. These dampers are required in systems in 
excess of 1 5 ,000 cfm and they must shut off complete flow 
on both sides of the air circulating fan. These dampers 
Fig. 5 
must be arranged so as to close whenever the fan is shut 
down; therefore, a motorized air control damper is ideal 
(Fig. 5). Additionally, one or more dampers are already in 
position as part of the air handling and mixing system ; it is 
not necessary to add additional dampers in this case, but 
only to rearrange the controls so that the already existing 
air  contro l  dampers may be ut i l ized as smoke con trol 
dampers in the fan room. Obviously these dampers cannot 
close whenever the fan is operating. The are closed only 
against the gravity flow of smoke. Should a fire occur 
when the fans are shut down, the dampers are already 
closed. Should smoke in the duct system trigger the detec-, 
tors the fan will also shut down and thereby cause the damp­
ers to close. 
It is important to note that there is nothing contained 
in Standard 90A that  has an y th ing to do with smoke 
dampers outside of the fan room. Fig. 6 shows a typical 
s mo ke - s to p  b arri er  as requ i red b y  N F P A  S t an dard 
I 0 I-The Life Safety Code. These barriers are required to 
be constructed as shown, not just to the ceiling but to the 
underside of the floor or roof above. This type of con­
struction is identical to that required for 2-hr fire partitions 
even though Standard 1 0 1  only requires a minimum of 
I -hr fire resistivity in smoke-slop barriers. There are many 
localities, in some instances entire states, which require 
fire dampers in all I-hr fire partitions. All penetrations of 
smoke-stop barriers must be protected with fire dampers in 
such localities. The H iII-Burton Act, in supplying federal 
funds for local hospital construction, has dramatized and 
expanded upon Standard 1 0 1  requirements so that it is 
now general knowledge that all smoke-stop barriers require 
. .  --______ . .  __ , • __ � _ .  ____ . -O' __ �.'":. '-- .--.. -- ... 
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smoke-stop dampers within the ducts which penetrate such 
barriers. Whether fire dampers are required or not in your 
jurisdiction within I-hr fire partitions, it still makes a great 
deal of sense to use fire damper type construction when a 
I -hr fire partition is being penetrated. 
A smoke-stop barrier damper and a fire damper have 
a great deal in common. Their basic functions are iden­
tical. When fire occurs-to supply enough heat within a 
duct to melt the fusible link-the fire damper then closes, 
1 9  
but it never closes for any reason other than the loca! haz­
ard in the duct. 
Ideally. a smoke-stop damper will not close unless 
there is smoke in the duct in the immediate vicinity of the 
damper; at that point it  must close ( Fig. 7). It is definitely 
not neces�ary. and as a matter of fact not desirable. for it 
to close for any reason other than a local hazard. This is 
certainly not the proper location for a motorized air con­
trol damper to open and shut obediently every time the 
main fans are turned on or off by manual or automatic 
operation. The smoke-stop barrier function has absolutely 
nothing to do with the cycling of the main fans. Any 
deviation from this separation of functions is erroneous en­
gineering extrapolation. Not the least of good reasons to 
eliminate air control type dampers in this area is the fact 
that control dampers are commonly gasketed with material 
which will not only add to the fire but add greatly to the 
smoke. Neoprene and polyurethane are commonly used 
gasket materials. Both of these will definitely add toxic 
fumes to the air stream when heated to several hundred 
deg F. Certainly this is not what is desired in a smoke­
stop barrier in a hospital. nursing home or any other oc­
cupancy for that matter. 
Fig. 7 
I t  is desirable to have dampers as smoke-tight as pos­
sible and with this particular design (Fig. 8) it has been ac­
complished by the use of a stainless steel jam gasket. The 
jam gasket bears on the edges of the blades to provide a 
tight seal when the blades are in the extended or closed 
position. Because of this drag it is necessary to spring-load 
the blades even when the damper is in a vertical position. 
It also has the advantage that the damper can be used in a 
horizontal position. which cannot be accomplished with a 
stall motor or a solenoid-operated type smoke damper. 
Highly reliable. Iow cost, electrically sensitive fusible 
links have recently been developed to convert both old 
and new fire damper designs into combination fire and 
smoke dampers. In short, industry has developed, and Un­
derwriter's Laboratories Inc has tested and listed the nec­
essary hardware to do the job. I t  is now up to concerned 
engineers to apply it. 
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Fig. 8 
A typical building under construction in the city of 
Philadelphia (Fig. 9). is 40 stories high and has one fan 
room for every 10 floors. The left hand shaft is exhaust 
duct, the middle shaft is return, and the right hand shaft is 
supply. The stair towers and elevator shafts are shown in 
a typical center core arrangement. 
Let's start the fire shown in lower right, Fig. 9. At 
this point there is no effect on the automatic detection sys­
tem which must be installed in this building under the 
requirements of Standard 90A. To get some reaction. it 
must burn longer. Smoke and poison gases are ventilated 
directly to the outside through the exhaust duct, which is � 
commendable. Additionally. smoke. poisons. and obscura-
tion are picked up in the return system and piped past the 
required smoke detectors in the air handling room. Still. 
there is absolutely no reaction. Why? Simply because the 
smoke is diluted 19 to I from the clean returns from the 
19 other half floors served by this air handling system . 
• • • • • 
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Fig. 1 0  
So, i t  must burn some more. Now, (Fig. 1 0) there i s  
exhaust from two areas and smoke i s  picked u p  and piped . 
directly into the fan room. The dilution is still 9 to 1 and 
no reaction. Detection equipment can be set to be sensi­
t ive  to t h a t  degree of d i lut ion  but  the bu i ld ing owner 
would have nothing but a string of false alarms with such a 
high degree of sensitivity in the air handling syste
.
m. In ac­
tual installations, the detectors are set at a relatively low 
range of sensitivity so that the condition shown in Fig. 1 0  
wiJI have t o  b e  duplicated in a t  least one, i f  not two more, 
of the Hoors so that approximately one-third of the 1 0-floor 
segment will be completely permeated with dense smoke. 
From the smoke beginning to leak into the elevator shafts, 
it is apparent that, by the time this condition has built up 
on three Hoors, the elevator shafts would definitely be out 
of service. 
Finally then, according to Standard 90A, the fans 
would shut down. Why? Obviously to prevent the smoke 
from being circulated to other areas not yet contaminate� . 
That's great, but every person remaining in the contamI­
nated areas is absolutely assured of no further supply of 
fresh air. There is another function required of this same 
system to be performed by this Standard-that is alarm. 
But the alarm Standards of N FPA require that once a 
bu i ld ing alarm is sou nded the ent ire b u i ld ing must  be 
alarmed w.hich will result in immediate attempted total 
evacuation. 
The Federal Fire Council has made a study of federal 
office buildings and other high-rise structures. It has been 
found that, on the average, it takes I min per Hoor for the 
last person to get within the relative safety of the stair 
tower. That means, in a 40-story building it would be 40 
min before the statistically last person has his blue-faced 
body fall through the stair tower doors. That's not all. A 
member of the National Research Council of Canada has 
worked up a time of evacuation by stairs in high buildings. 
He notes that the net resultant discharge from stairs, in 
the number of people per min, increases as the density 
increases from 15 sq ft per person all the way down to 3 
sq ft per person. The concentration of people more than 
makes up for the reduced velocity of How up to and 
including 3 sq ft per person. It  falls off significantly at 2 
1 /2 sq ft per person but it stalls dead at 2 sq ft per person. 
That is, it doesn't move at all. Nobody moves when they 
are allocated 2 sq ft or less. This condition prevails many 
times in the total evacuation of high-rise buildings. That, 
then, is precisely the limit of the life safety that is pro­
vided for you and your families in high-rise buildings by 
the current Standards. 
Take an identical  bui lding and apply some of the 
knowledge and design criteria stipulated for hospitals and 
nursing homes. Subdivide each Hoor into two separate
. 
smoke zones (as in Fig. 1 1 ). With center-core construction 
it is relatively inexpensive because the center core parti­
tions must be of 2-hr fire construction and are, therefore, 
already smoke-stop barriers as well. h is only necessary to 
add doors at both ends of the elevator lobby as well as con­
necting smoke barriers from the core to the outer wall at 
two places shown. This can be · accomplished merely by 
persuading the architect to upgrade the construction stan­
dard of several of the partitions so that they go from slab 
to slab and are given a fire resistive rating of not less than 
1 hr. 






Fig. 1 1  
Given the same fire, at this stage nothing will happen 
(Fig. 1 1 ). But, exhaust has been vented to the outside and 
a very minor amount of smoke has entered the return air 
system. Finally (Fig. 1 2) ,  smoke is drawn within the chase 
itself. 
Fig. 1 3  shows how this is done. The return duct is 
furnished with a duct type smoke detector (large black 
dot). The dotted line to its left shows the sampling tube so 
that all return air is constantly monitored. When the one­
half floor const i tu t ing th is  part icular  smoke zone has 
smoke in one-third of it, there is sufficiently
' 
dense smoke 
to trigger the detector and to provide an improved method 
of personnel protection:  
I .  Alarm, but not throughout the entire building. Only 
21 
Fig. 1 2  
Fig. 13 
the smoke floor and the floor immediately above are 
a larmed.  Therefo re ,  there i s  m o re than adequate s tair 
tower for evacuation if needed. But the alarm doesn't stop 
there. Also required is a direct wire to the local fire com­
pany so that it is definitely called and on the way. 
2. Fire dampers already in place are actuated at the 
return and supply branches off the main risers. These fire 
dampers must be provided under current codes. All that is 
necess ary is to u pgrade them to combi nation fire and 
smoke dampers by adding metallic gasketing and elec­
trically operated actuators. 
3. The special vent system, is opened up;  that is, the 
small white damper in the lower right hand corner is elec­
trically released to open. It is a normally-closed, tight-
22 
sealing, spring-loaded, air control damper which opens and 
simultaneously turns on an exhaust fan on the roof. This 
fan sets up a tremendous negative pressure in the open 
area around the ducts. I f  such a l arge free area cannot be 
provided within a single shaft, it might be better to design 
a separate and distinct smoke shaft. In any event the 
smoke exhaust fan is to be designed to evacuate a mini­
mum of 1 5  changes per hr from the largest single con­
nected smoke zone. 
4. An electrical impulse is sent around to the other 
part of the same floor to close return damper in that area. 
Looking at the system under normal operation, it is 
apparent that the supply is balanced by the return and 
exhaust, maintaining the same pressure inside the zone as 
out. In event of the detection of smoke, supply and return 
close, exhaust continues and the vent is opened introduc­
ing a substantial negative pressure within the smoke zone. 
If there is a tremendous amount of fuel and the fire 
company is delayed getting to the site, it may be necessary 
to actuate the ordinary fire dampers (2 1 2  F standard links) 
in both the exhaust and the vent openings in order to pro­
tect other floors from the spread of fire within the shaft. 
The system is capable of sealing itself. However, in most 
cases with the quick response time now experienced by 
major city fire companies, they generally can get to the 
site and start suppressing the fire and heat before this con­
dition would be reached. 
Referring back to Fig. 1 2, it is now apparent that the 
clean area to the left is a safe area of refuge because it is 
under pressure and anyone evacuating from the smoke 
zone through the smoke doors (which will have to be in­
stalled in the smoke barriers) will be evacuating from a � relatively low pressure to a higher pressure, enabling the 
smoke to be detained behind and providing them with a 
supply of fresh air as they are evacuating. Normally, the 
air-conditioning system in the area of refuge will be set up 
for approximately 6 to 8 air changes per hr providing only 
about 50% make-up air for the 1 5  times exhaust capacity 
required in the smoke zone. Two points to be made are: 
I .  Some may criticize making up air to a fire with this 
system b u t ,  do not forget, this  ent ire system is  b u i l t  
around life safety and not property protection. The build­
ing should burn. It should burn cleanly, and rapidly but, 
nevertheless, people can get out more easily with a clean 
fire than a smoldering, smoky type. 
2. If make-up air is to he provided why not provide 
1 00% by continuing to supply fresh air directly into the 
smoke zone? The answer lies in the elevator lobby. Peo-
ple, being human, are not subject to engineering, particu-
larly in times of panic and stress. Most people would tend 
to go directly to the elevator lobby thinking simply "I 
came in this way and I want to get out this way." The 
problem is that elevator shafts are frequently under nega-
tive pressure. An elevator shaft and the adjacent lobby arc 
going to have identical pressures because of the loose fit-
ting doors. One cannot determine the pressure in the lobby 
unless all factors of weather, type of air conditioning or 
heating, height of building and the particular noor on 
which the fire occurs, are known. Only when all these fac-
.. tors are available can that pressure be determined . How- • 
ever, it can be safety stated that more than 50% of the 
t ime i t  w il l  b e  s o m e w h at l e s s  than a m b i e n t  pre s s u re .  
Therefore, the elevator lobby must be designed for a nega­
tive pressure. H aving that design condition, the pressure in 
the smoke zone must be still lower. For this reason, a 
system must be provided having a substantial negative 
pressure in the smoke zone. This takes care of not only 
the elevator lobby but also the stair towers which are sub­
ject to the same problems as elevators but not as severe. 
These provisions as outlined may be criticized as rev­
olutionary or expensive. I have only one defense. This 
plan w i l l  s a v e  l i v e s .  O u r  w hole exit  h ardware d es ig n  
theory did not come from you. It  did not come from the 
architects. It  did not come from any professionals. It came 
from the Iroquois Theater in 1 903 when 602 people died 
in panic. But that didn't stick. Th�t engineering was too 
old and the whole business had to be redesigned in 1 942 
in Boston at the Cocoanut Grove when 492 people were 
killed by smoke inhalation and panic. Almost 1 100 people, 
in two tragedies alone, dedicated, albeit unwillingly, their 
lives towards safer exit design. Just a few months ago, 1 44 
French teenagers were trapped, tampled and asphyxiated 
under identical circumstances. Will we ever learn? On the 
subject of sprinklers 95 pupils and nuns died in the Our 
Lady of Angels school fire in Chicago. Our sprinkler 
codes are now slightly more up to date. When it comes to 
smoke, 3 2  elderly people perished at Marietta, Ohio in a 
nursing home. A building code variance was applied for 
and permission received to leave out the smoke-stop parti- ' 
tions and save $3300, at a savings of $ 100 a l ife, How 
much longer must we design by disaster? 
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CAN SPRINKLER SYSTEMS SOLVE 
BUILDING CODE PROBLEMS? 
E. J. REILLY 
Can sprinkler systems solve building code problems? What 
are the problems? Whose problems are they? Can sprinkler 
systems solve those problems? 
WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS? 
To help answer this question, lets ask another question - a 
more fundamental one. Why do building codes exist at all? 
A building code is a law. As a law, its only purpose is to 
provide for the public health or the public safety. So lets 
dispel the notion that building codes have anything to do 
with the preservation of private property - except insofar 
as the protection of private property as directly related to 
the public safety .  
Let m e  illustrate. 
Every building code, including the four nationally recog­
nized Model Building Codes, contains a Statement of 
Purpose in its first chapter or in  its preface. Let's take an 
example: 
The Uniform Building Code is quite typical of all 
building codes insofar as its Statement of Purpose is 
concerned. 
Part One, Chapter One of that code sets forth its state­
ment of purpose as follows, "The purpose of this Code 
is to provide minimum standards to safeguard life or 
limb, health, property, and public welfare by regulating 
and controlling the design, construction, quality of ma­
terials, use and occupancy, location and maintenance of 
all buildings and structures within the city and certain 
equipment specifically regulated herein." 
When governments establish codes to protect the public 
safety,  certain problems such as cost and design flexibility 
are created. 
The Problem of Cost 
Public safety costs money. And there is more than one way 
to achieve the public safety objective of build ing codes. 
There are degrees of safety and variables in construction 
cost. The most expensive construction does not necessarily 
provide for the highest degree of public safety. 
Design Flexibility 
Since codes recognize that there is more than one way to 
design a safe building, there must be some freedom given to 
the architect to use a variety of building products or to 
design a building in varying configurations. 
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How do automatic sprinkler systems help solve some of 
these problems? 
Let's take the problem of building costs first. Of all the 
items of cost measured by the U.S.  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, none has risen more rapidly than have construc­
tion costs. 
Indeed the Federal Government - specifically the 
National Commission on Urban Problems, commonly known 
as the Douglas Commission, appointed by President 
Johnson-examined building codes under a federal micro­
scope. They found a connection between the rising cost of 
construction and building codes. 
How do automatic sprinkler systems help reduce build­
ing costs, under the provisions of building costs and how 
can some of the principles found in modern building codes 
be further implemented to help off-set the rising costs of 
ooru�ct�? 
� Let's take a hypothetical example : A commercial build- � 
ing developer has decided to build a large shopping center. 
The shopping complex will be located outside of fire limits 
where parking space is available. Some of the stores he 
plans to build will be small, but other will be as large as 
1 00,000 sq ft in area. All buildings will be one story in 
height . 
The builder and his architect sit dOWl1 together to 
decide how the building wiII be designed and built and to 
estimate the cost of construction. The architect suggests 
that a concrete and steel building be designed with 4 hr 
exterior bearing anc. non-bearing walls, 3 hr interior bearing 
walls, 3 hr protected structural frame, 2 hr floors, and a 
minimum of 1 hr rated interior permanent partitions. In a 
word, he was talking about a Type I building as defined in 
most modern building codes. 
The selection of this type of construction would enable 
them to build to unlimited areas, a permission granted to 
no other type of construction. Heavy timber buildings, 
wood frame or unprotected steel buildings, could not be 
built to areas larger than a few thousand sq fl. 
They priced out the job at $ 1 6/sq ft , including air con­
ditioning but excluding an automatic sprinkler system, land 
costs and site work. The cost of it was too high .  
They tried it another way. They decided to cost out the 
job by eliminating the 3 hr interior bearing walls, the 3 hr 
protection of structural frame members and then reducing 
all of the fire protection around permanent partitions, .. 
vertical openings, floors and roofs by 1 hr. In effect wha t • 
they were designing was a bare steel building with brick 
exterior walls. This would be a Type III-N building under 
the Uniform Building Code - the code adopted in their 
locals. 
The elimination of these fire protective reduced con­
struction cost by $4/sq ft, or by $400,000 to cover the 
cost of the 1 00,000 sq ft mercantile they planned to build. 
But one problem had not been solved. Despite the fact 
that the building was located outside of fire limits, with 
wide side yards on all four sides of the buildings, the build­
ing code would not permit any structure of this type to 
exceed 24,000 sq ft in area. And even if the code permitted 
its construction, who would insure its contents - or the 
building itself for that matter? 
Looking to the "Use and Occupancy " chapter of the 
Code, they found that they could build this unprotected 
steel building without any area limitation, if they installed 
an approved automatic sprinkler system throughout the 
building. 
Even after adding $ .50  cents/sq ft for a sprinkler system, 
they found that they had a cost construction saving of 
$350,000 - a savings of about 23%. 
This example really illustrates two principles found in 
most modern building codes: ( 1 )  automatic sprinklers can 
be used to reduce construction costs; and (2) automatic 
sprinklers can be used to augment the freedom of the 
architect to select different kinds of building materials and 
designs to protect the public safety. 
Since we are talking about the principles of cost control 
in construction and design flexibility, let's take a look at 
some of these principles and see how they work and why 
they work. 
Let's take a look at the thinking that lies beneath the 
permission granted by building codes to increase areas of 
buildings when sprinklers are installed (Fig. I ). This build­
ing could be the mercantile previously discussed. 
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Fig. 1 
The NFPA Sprinkler Performance Tables tell us that 
43.6% of fires are held in check or extinguished by one 
sprinkler. Since ordinary hazard pipe schedules would 
protect about 1 30 sq ft of space, we can see that 43.6% of 
fires are held inside of an area of 1 30 sq ft. Three sprinklers 
within an area of 390 sq ft hold or extinguish 7 1 .2% of 
fires ;  89.9% of fires are held or extinguished within an area 





Hence the basic reason for granting area increases in 
sprinklered buildings is because a small number of sprinklers 
keep fires within small areas by extinguishing them or con­
trolling them in their incipient stages. 
Fig. 2 shows a six story, Type V I hr (wood frame) 
apartment building. The building code where this building 
was erected, limits wood frame construction to three stories 
in height but permits an additional story if the building is 
sprinklered throughout. Since the building code only 
permits the addition of one story, or limits the height of a 
wood frame I hr protected building to four stories, why do 
we show this as a six story building? Because its our con­
tention that if unlimited areas can be permitted, why not 
unlimited heights? 
Obviously wood frame construction has certain struc­
tural limitations in terms of its load bearing capacity and 
from an engineering standpoint it · would be unfeasible to 
build to more than six stories in height. Our purpose in 
showing you this building is to illustrate the principle, that 
in completely sprinklered buildings, the only limiting factor 
governing height increases should be structural engineering 
design, load and stress bearing factors, not fire protection. 
Most building codes derive their exit requirements from 
NFPA Standard 1 0 1 ,  "Safety to Life," which permits the 
distance between exits to be increased by 50% when 





(bottom) which is longer and has a greater distance between 
its exits than the unsprinklered school (top). The sprin­
klered school is allowed greater flexibility because the auto­
matic sprinkleres extinguish the fire in its incipient stages 
making the building tenable from both the heat and smoke 
standpoint. This fact should give building occupants more 
time to evacuate; hence greater distance travel is permissible 
for sprinklered bUildings. 
This provision is found in all building codes that we 
know of. It has two effects from the standpoint of the 
architect, builder and owner: ( I )  It reduces construction 
costs by eliminating a stairway or by adding more useable 
floor space between exits. (2) It increases the architects 
design flexibility when he specifies automatic sprinkler sys­
tems. 
Fig. 4 is a blank wall building. It has no windows on 
any side, is air conditioned and is provided with artificial 
light throughout. The only exits are on the main floor and 
the distance between exits is specified in the code. 
Fig. 4 
This type of construction is becoming increasingly 
popular especially in mercantiles. Some cities have built 
experimental schools of this type of construction in areas 
having a high incidence of vandalism. Its considerably less 
expensive to build than windowed buildings. Temperatures 
within the building can be regulated more easily. But fire 




venting such buildings. Most building codes require auto­
matic sprinklers in these buildings. This building illustrates 
the fact that design flexibility is available to the architect 
and he is given the freedom to design such a building if he 
makes use of automatic sprinkler systems. Reduced con­
struction cost is a by-product. 
Fig. 5 shows an enclosed stairway in a mercantile. Some 
building codes permit the use of open stairways (Fig. 6) if 
buildings are sprinklered throughout, thereby allowing the 
architect greater design freedom. 
Essentially escalators correspond to open stairways with 
regard to building codes. They normally do not constitute 
exits since they do not usually provide a means of egress 
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to a public way outside of the building, although some 
building codes require the use of wired glass enclosures 
around escalators unless sprinklers are installed.  
Figs. 7 and 8 indicate what happens to a building when 
an architect uses automatic sprinklers to move from a 
higher type to a lower type of construction. Notice that 
the fire protectives are reduced by one hour for bearing 
walls, ceilings and non-bearing walls. The result of this as 
we saw earlier, can bring about construction cost savfugs of 
25% or more. 
Fig. 9 is a high rise building. It resembles the Hartford 
Hospital where 1 0  patients died in a fire several years ago. 
Since that fire, there has been some agitation in the building 
code congresses to require automatic sprinklers in buildings 
over 80 ft in height, since most cities, especially smaller 
cities, do not have equipment capable of fire fighting or 
rescue at levels beyond 80 ft, since this is considered to be 
a maximum safe distance from which to perform rescues or 
to fight fires. Most fire department ladder equipment 
extend 85 ft vertically. 
Automatic fire protection in high rise buildings will 
probably become mandatory over the next few years be­
cause a great number of these buildings are being built, 
especially in smaller cities. Rochester, Minn. was the first 
city in the U.S. to enact a mandatory requirement for 
sprinklers in high rise buildings. In New Haven, Conn.,  a 25 
story office building i s  being sprinklered throughout. I t  is 
constructed of unprotected (bare) steel. To our knowledge, 
this building is unprecedented. Nevertheless, it is expected 
that this kind of building, sprinklered throughout, will be­
come the protcitype for high rise buildings in the future. 
CAN SPRI NKLERS SYSTEMS SOLVE BUI LDING 
CODE PROBLEMS? 
We think you will all have to concede that the answer to 
that question is "yes." Because codes have recognized the 
value of automatic sprinkler systems, architects can design 
buildings with greater freedom than ever before. Con­
struction costs are reduced and the public is given more 
safety from fire than any time in our history. 
Enourmous advances have been made in building codes 
and especially in recent years. Code writers have exploited 
Fig. 9 
the advantages of automatic sprinklers to solve building 
code problems. But new problems are being created right 
now by some 2 1  st century architect, engineer or designer 
who is thinking of some space age building that you and I 
have not yet conceived. And some how automatic sprinklers 
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